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We study how foreign competition affects the composition of investments inside firms. A
parsimonious model predicts that firms have an incentive to shift their investments towards
more short-term assets when exposed to tougher competition. Using data on expenditures of
listed US companies into various asset classes with different lifespans, we document empirical
evidence that is consistent with this prediction. Over a fifteen year period between 1995 and
2009, the rise in import competition is associated with a reduction of the firm-specific asset
lifespan by about 4.5% on average. We additionally exploit the Chinese WTO accession as
an exogenous shock in firm expectations about future exposure to competition.
Keywords: import competition, firm investment behavior, investment life-span, short-
termism
JEL classification: F14, F36, F65, G32, L20, D22




Firms invest in expectation of some future benefits. A vigorous policy debate is in progress
over the origins and consequences of short-term corporate behavior: when firms in the economy
face short-term incentives and do not invest sufficiently long-term, into assets that pay off in
distant future, this can be impedimental for economic growth.1 The literature has identified that
credit crunches, uncertainty, investor pressures or agency problems can be causal for short-term
investment behavior (see Aghion et al. (2010), Garicano and Steinwender (2016), Terry (2015),
Garicano and Rayo (2016) and Bénabou and Tirole (2016)). In this paper, we put forward
another reason for corporate short-termism: we argue that foreign competition can induce firms
to distort investments away from assets that pay off in distant future towards short-term assets.
Falling trade barriers leading to a dramatic rise in international trade flows are a defining feature
of the past century. The associated increase in competitive pressure from abroad can threaten
domestic firms. When competition lowers future price-cost margins and thereby reduces the
quasi-rents from durable investments, import competition might discourage long-term firm in-
vestments leading to adjustments of the investment composition across different asset classes
within firms.
To guide our empirical analysis, we provide a simple model. We consider a firm in a two-period
economy which engages in two types of investment: a short-term one and a long-term one. While
short-term investments reduce production costs today and yield an immediate payoff, investments
into more durable assets reduce future production costs and therefore pay off at a later point
in time. When tougher competition from abroad reduces future price-cost margins, firms are
incentivized to shift their investment expenditures towards nondurable investments.
To estimate the effect of foreign competition on the investment composition inside firms, we use
our model to derive a within-firm difference-in-differences estimator. Our model predicts that
1Hillary Clinton’s US presidential election campaign is a prominent example for this policy debate about short-
term corporate behavior. Creating stronger incentives for firms to plan for the long-run is part of the program of
the Democratic Party for the upcoming legislative period: “We need an economy where companies plan for the long
run [. . . ] - leading to higher productivity, better service, and larger profits.”, Hillary Clinton, 2016. Part of this
debate also comes from business experts themselves. For example, Larry Fink, the CEO of the investment firm
BlackRock stated: “Over the past several years, I have written to the CEOs of leading companies urging resistance
to the powerful forces of short-termism afflicting corporate behavior. Reducing these pressures and working instead
to invest in long-term growth remains an issue of paramount importance for BlackRock’s clients, most of whom
are saving for retirement and other long-term goals, as well as for the entire global economy.”
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within a firm in a given year, tougher foreign competition should lead to a relatively larger reduc-
tion in long-term investments vis-à-vis short-term investments. We use data for the population
of stock listed manufacturing firms in the US between 1995 and 2009 to test this prediction.
Using data on listed firms has two major advantages for our empirical analysis. First, listed
firms disclose investment expenditures across different asset categories which differ in their dura-
bility. Similar to Garicano and Steinwender (2016), we exploit variation in durability across
asset groups to distinguish between short- and long-term investments.2 Second, we can use the
volatility of each firm’s equity within a given year to control for time variation in the distance
to firm insolvency and uncertainty.
With the data at hand, we estimate how changes in the sectoral degree of foreign competition lead
to a shift of firms’ investment composition. We find that between 1995 and 2009, firms became
on average more short-term oriented when the level of sectoral import competition increased.
Specifically, our estimates suggest that the average increase in import competition by 60% during
our sample period has reduced the lifespan of firm assets by 71 days on average, which corresponds
to 4.5% of the average asset lifespan. Presuming a refinancing rate of 3%, this would impose an
additional interest cost of 6$ for each 1000$ invested.
We find this result to be robust to controlling for several alternative channels that could coun-
teract our results. First, trade liberalization could be associated with a lower probability of firm
survival as suggested by the selection mechanism in models of firm heterogeneity à la Melitz
(2003). Alternatively, perceived uncertainty could increase due to a changing market environ-
ment. As both, a lower probability of firm survival or spikes in uncertainty could lead to a
postponement of long-term investments,3 we control for the probability of future firm survival.
We find that a lower likelihood of firm survival cannot fully explain our effects, approximating
a firm’s distance to insolvency by the inverse of its equity volatility as proposed by Atkeson
et al. (2013). Second, the level of import competition could be correlated with developments in
the domestic industry. For example, if US industries become more productive over time, this
2Specifically, we consider seven investment categories which we group according to their durability by means of
depreciation rates derived from accounting rules: Advertising expenditures, Computer expenditures, expenditures
on R&D, expenditures on Transportation Equipment, expenditures on Machinery, expenditures on Buildings and
expenditures on Land.
3See Aghion et al. (2010) and Garicano and Steinwender (2016) for the relation between firm liquidity risk and
investments or Bloom (2009), Handley and Limão (2015) and Novy and Taylor (2014) for the relation between
uncertainty, trade and investments.
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might lead to relatively more long-term investments and a lower level of import competition.
Therefore, we control for changes in total factor productivity, capital- and skill-intensity of the
US manufacturing industries. Third, we find our results to be robust to controlling for foreign
inputs, financial frictions like credit constraints or the 2007-2009 financial crisis and alternative
measures of asset lifespans or future competition. Lastly, as our estimation is based on the
within-firm responses across investment categories, we are able to take account for potential
alternative firm-specific demand or technology shocks.
Since the residual demand is relatively more elastic for smaller firms, we expect that the invest-
ment composition inside smaller firms adjusts more strongly to an increase in foreign competition.
Thus, we expect that firm heterogeneity matters for the relative size of this effect. We investi-
gate this role of firm heterogeneity on investment responses empirically and find support for that
prediction. When comparing investment responses across the firm size distribution, we find that
shifts in investments towards less durable assets as a response to foreign competition are more
vigorous among smaller firms. Comparing a firm at the 10th percentile with a firm at the 90th
percentile of the firm size distribution (in terms of assets), we find that the lifespan of assets
decreases by about 17 days more in the smaller firm.
Lastly, we exploit the WTO accession of China in 2001 as a quasi-natural experiment to study how
a change in firms’ expectations about future competition shapes their investment composition.
After China was granted WTO membership in 2001, the US Congress was not anymore in the
position to annually ratify tariff rates on Chinese imports. We argue that this abolition of the
opportunity to protect US industries led to an increase in the expected exposure to competition
from China from 2001 on, particularly for firms in industries that historically have been protected
by high tariffs. In line with our model, we find that firms in industries with high pre-WTO tariffs
shifted their investments towards less durable assets as a response to the rise in expected import
competition from China. Our estimates suggest that between 1999 and 2003, firms with pre-
WTO tariffs at the 75th percentile reduced the life span of investments by about 168 days more
than a firm with pre-WTO tariffs at the 25th percentile.
Generally, our paper relates to the literature that analyzes within-firm adjustments to inter-
national competition. Bloom et al. (2016), Hashmi (2013) and Gorodnichenko et al. (2010)
examine the impact of foreign competition on innovation activities inside firms. Bustos (2011)
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and Lileeva and Trefler (2010) study how access to foreign markets can induce investments in
technology upgrading. While these studies analyze the absolute level of firm investments and
innovation activities in response to trade liberalization, our focus is on changes in the compo-
sition of investments within firms with respect to more or less durable assets. Furthermore,
the literature on multiproduct firms suggests that the exposure to tougher foreign competition
incentivizes firms to shift their product portfolio towards their core products (see e.g. Eckel and
Neary (2010), Bernard et al. (2010) or Mayer et al. (2014)). While these studies analyze within
firm adjustments to competition with respect to the production side of firms, our study considers
a within firm adjustment with respect to the capital side of firms.
Our paper is also related to a nascent literature that studies the impact of international trade
on corporate finance. Fresard (2010) finds that large corporate cash holdings lead to systematic
future market share gains at the expense of industry rivals when an industry is hit by an import
competition shock. Valta (2012) studies how the costs of bank credit respond to foreign competi-
tion and finds that firms face higher loan spreads when import competition toughens. Xu (2012)
studies the financing response during periods of higher competition and finds that firms reduce
their leverage by issuing equity and selling assets to repay debt when experiencing increases in
import competition. While previous studies show that credit constraints determine firms’ op-
portunities to participate in exporting (see e.g. Manova (2013), Foley and Manova (2015)), our
paper studies the impact of foreign competition on the composition of firm investments which
affects demand for credit itself.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework,
section 3 describes the data, identification and the empirical results. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
To understand the impact of competition on firms’ investment behavior, we lay out a framework
which incorporates the inter-temporal investment decision of a firm with respect to short- and
long-term investments. The main goal of the section is to guide our empirical work.
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2.1 Demand and Industry Structure
We consider an economy that exists for two time periods t ∈ {0, 1}. During each period t the
economy is composed of Lt consumers which derive their demand from a linear-quadratic utility
function following Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). As a result, firms face a linear demand
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p̄t at which demand for a variety is driven to zero. This upper
price bound pmaxt is an inverse measure of the toughness of competition. A larger degree of
differentiation γ, a larger mass of competing varieties Nt or a lower average price level p̄t all
trigger a decline in the price bound pmaxt such that firms are forced to charge lower prices in
order to generate positive demand for their product.4 Firms face a larger price elasticity of
demand if they set higher prices or if the intensity of competition in the economy increases.5
2.2 Production and Investment Decision
Production in the differentiated goods sector occurs at constant returns to scale with marginal
costs c∗ representing the corresponding unit labor requirement. Most importantly, we assume
that profit maximizing firms can opt for two types of investment in order to reduce their marginal
costs of production c∗. Short-term investments k reduce the unit costs of production instanta-
neously to c0 = c
∗ − (c∗)θ k0.5 in period 0. Long-term investments z yield larger productivity
gains which however only materialize during the subsequent period 1 and reduce the firm’s unit
production costs to c1 = c
∗ − ϕ (c∗)θ z0.5 with ϕ > 1.6 Higher levels of investment relate to
4The parameters α and η are both positive and determine the pattern of substitution between a numéraire good
and the differentiated varieties. An increase in α and a decrease in η induce an upward shift in the consumption
levels of the differentiated varieties relative to the numéraire. If γ = 0, the varieties are perfect substitutes
and consumers only focus on the total level of consumption. A rise in γ however implies that the degree of
differentiation augments and consumers care about the distribution of consumption levels across varieties.
5The price elasticity of demand is given by εit ≡ |(∂qit/∂pit) (pit/qit)| = [(p
max
t /pit)− 1]
−1. This stands in
contrast to a CES demand where price elasticity is uniquely determined by the level of product differentiation γ.
6The basic set-up of the investment function is akin to Dhingra (2013).
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lower unit costs with decreasing returns to scale.7 The magnitude of cost reductions however
depends on firm productivity c∗ and the parameter θ. With θ > 0 a unit of investment reduces
marginal costs to a larger extent for less productive firms whereas θ < 0 implies that low cost
firms are more efficient in cutting costs. For the sake of simplicity, we assume a unit of short-term
investment k and long-term investment z are both equally costly and require r units of labor to
finance the investment.
In both periods firms compete on a monopolistically competitive market and take the average








If a firm’s unit costs are just as high such that it earns zero profits, it is indifferent about





= cDt = p
max
t . Thus, c
D
t reflects the intensity of competition in the economy as the
threshold incorporates the impact of both, the average price level and the number of firms. A
reduction in cDt implies a rise in the toughness of competition, as firms need to exhibit lower costs
of production in order to produce profitably. Moreover, cDt integrates the impact of competition
on firms’ prices, demand and profits. Intuitively, firms with lower marginal costs charge lower
prices for which reason they generate larger demand and earn higher profits. Beyond that, they
face a lower price elasticity of demand which allows them to set higher mark-ups of price over
marginal costs. An increase in market size Lt raises profits whereas more intense competition,
reflected by a reduction in cDt , decreases demand and squeezes mark-ups implying that firms
loose earnings.
Having explained the basic organization of production, we now turn towards firm investments
and the choice between short- and long-term investments. Taking the size of the market Lt and




π (c0) + (1− δ)π (c1)− rk − rz. (3)
7In order for the effective marginal costs c not to become negative, investments k and z are restricted by firm
productivity c∗. This however is no critical assumption since our primary interest is in the composition and not
in the absolute level of short- and long-term investments.
7
Determining the first order conditions with respect to short- and long-term investments and





















From equations (4) and (5) it becomes clear that stronger competition (smaller cD) reduces the
marginal return of investment and thus diminishes investment volumes. However, we are not
interested in the effects on the investment volume of firms but want to study the composition
of investments inside firms. Building ratios of equations (4) and (5) and taking logs finally
leaves us with the following expression for the relative composition of short-term and long-term
investments k and z:




























2.3 The Impact of Import Competition on Investment Composition
We now analyze the effect of import competition on the relative composition of short-term
and long-term investments. When competition rises (cD1 < c
D
0 ) firms’ profits in period 1 fall
which in turn diminishes the value of long-term investments relative to short-term investments.
As such, firms have an incentive to adjust their investment composition towards short-lived
investments when they expect competition to become tougher in period 1. Figure 1 illustrates
the effect. Firms choose the investment composition that equalizes the marginal return of short-
and long-term investments.8 The optimal composition of investments (k∗, z∗) is therefore given
by the intersection of the marginal return of short- (MRk) and long-term investments (MRz).
According to our model, an increase in the intensity of competition reduces the return of long-
term investments for any level of z thereby shifting the MRz-curve downwards (the red, dashed
curve). A new intersection of both marginal return curves emerges giving rise to a larger fraction
of short-term investments and a smaller fraction of long-term investments.
8If a firm expected a larger return in one type of investment than in the other, the firm would invest more into
that investment type. Since we assumed decreasing marginal returns, the firm would increase investments until
marginal returns are equalized.
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In order to identify the investment distortion created by international competition, we compare
the investment composition of a firm expecting an increase in import competition (△comp > 0)
with the investment composition of a firm expecting no increase in import competition (△comp =
0). If the firm expects import competition to increase between period 0 and period 1, relative
investments [ln (k)− ln (z)]△comp>0 are given by equation (6). If the level of competition however
remains unchanged and cD1 = c
D
0 it follows that















Hence, with a constant level of competition the relative investments are exclusively determined
by market size in both time periods. Subtracting the investment composition in the case with
constant competition (7) from the investment composition in the case with increasing competition
(6) provides us with the following difference-in-differences equation identifying the shift in the
relative composition of investments induced by tougher import competition









Summing up, international competition from abroad entails tougher competition in period 1.
This lowers firms’ market power and profits such that the value of long-term investments relative
to short-term investments is reduced. Thus, an increase in import competition incentivizes firms
to shift their investment expenditure towards investments characterized by a shorter lifespan.
Based on these theoretical considerations we derive the following testable prediction.
Prediction 1: The prospect of tougher import competition increases the amount of short-term
relative to long-term investments.
2.4 Heterogeneous Investment Responses across Firms
From our difference-in-differences equation (8) it becomes obvious that the size of the investment
shift depends on the parameter c∗. For less productive firms, the relative loss in profits in period
1 compared to period 0 is more pronounced than for firms with lower unit costs. While all firms
lose profits and market power, the relative change in profits across time decreases with firm size
9
and productivity.9 Accordingly, this leads to a smaller reduction in the marginal return of long-
term investments MRz relative to the marginal return of short-term investments MRk for larger
firms. Thus, smaller firms with a more elastic residual demand curve shift their composition of
investments to a larger extent towards more short-lived investments.
Prediction 2: The prospect of tougher import competition increases the amount of short-term
relative to long-term investments more for smaller firms.
2.5 The Impact of Market Size on Investment Composition
Given that trade liberalization is typically associated with both, higher import competition
and larger export markets, we also study what an increase in market size would imply for our
difference-in-differences estimator. From equations (4) and (5) it becomes clear that a larger
market size Lt generates additional demand such that the marginal return of short- and long-
term investments increases resulting in a higher level of firm investments for a given level of cDt
(for both types of investments).10
An increase in market size L1 > L0 in period 1 raises demand and profits and thus the relative
value of long-term investments, such that firms become less short-term oriented. Hence, the
market size effect works in the opposite direction to the competition effect. In Figure 2, this is
depicted by an upward shift of the MRz-curve as the marginal return of long-term investments
increases for any level of z. As a result, the new intersection of the marginal return of short-
and long-term investments shifts to the left implying a reduction in the fraction of short-term
investments while the fraction of long-term investments increases.11 In the empirical analysis,
we therefore also take account of this market size effect to control confounding effects.
9In our theoretical framework, firm size and productivity are isomorph. We employ employment, assets, and
sales as different empirical counterparts of firm size.
10These effects of trade liberalization on the investment volume of firms have been studied empirically by Lileeva
and Trefler (2010) and Bustos (2011).
11The magnitude of the effect depends again on firm productivity c∗. However, the role of productivity is
ambiguous and depends on the sign of the parameter θ which determines the impact of firm productivity on the
efficiency of investments. If θ > 0, less productive firms are more efficient in cutting costs and thus they face
relatively larger incentives to engage in long-term investments. If θ < 0, high productive firms are more effective
in lowering unit costs such that an increase in market size in period 1 creates larger incentives for high productive
firms to shift investment expenditures towards long-term investments. As long as θ = 0, firm productivity has no





Equation (8) serves as theoretical guideline to set up our baseline econometric estimation strategy
in order to identify the effect of import competition on the composition of firm investments. Based
on equation (8) we derive the following difference-in-differences specification where Iisct denotes
investments by firm i in investment category c at time t
ln (Iisct) = β0 + β1 × ln (ImpCompst)× Short-Termc +X′isctζ + λc + λit + εisct, (9)
where ImpCompst is our proxy for the exposure of import competition expected in year t which
varies across industries s. Short-Termc reflects the duration of an investment category c. In
order to distinguish between long- and short-term investments, we rank each firm’s investments
into different assets according to their time to payoff. We follow here the approach suggested
by Garicano and Steinwender (2016) and exploit expenditures on Advertising, Computer Equip-
ment, R&D, Transportation Equipment, Machinery Equipment as well as on Buildings and Land.
In our specification, the rate of duration follows an ordering where a higher ranking implies a
more short-lived investment category. Alternatively, we also use depreciation rates. By tak-
ing the natural logarithm of investment expenditures, we exclude zeros from our estimations.
However, since we consider the universe of stock listed manufacturing firms, zero investments
occur relatively rarely in our data.12 X′
isct
is a vector of control variables. λc and λit are fixed
effects for different investment types as well as for firm-year combinations in order to sweep
out unobserved firm-specific factors that vary across time and affect the investment decisions of
firms. Notably, this includes demand shocks, credit shocks or technology shocks as long as they
do not affect short- and long-term investments differently. Identification is therefore based on
variation across investment categories within a firm for a given year. Most importantly, in this
specification β1 identifies the distortion in the relative composition of firm investments created
12See Table 10 for the amount of zeros in investment categories. Furthermore, we also find support for our
prediction when considering the extensive margin of investments across categories instead of using investment
amounts.
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by import competition and reflected in our theoretical model in equation (8).13 Altogether, fol-
lowing Prediction 1 , if import competition leads firms to adjust their composition of investments
towards short-term investment categories, the coefficient of interest is expected to be positive
(β1 > 0).
In our theoretical framework, firms adjust their investments when they expect future competition
to change as this differentially affects the return on long- and short-term investments. As we
do not observe how firms shape their expectations about competition in the future and since
survey evidence suggests that there is wide dispersion in the formation of macroeconomic beliefs
across firms (see Coibion et al. (2015)), we use the contemporaneous level of import competition
in our baseline estimation. In our data, changes in the level of import competition are very
persistent (the correlation coefficient between ln (ImpCompst+1) and ln (ImpCompst) is larger
than 0.9) and when firms compare the current level of competition with their past to infer their
future exposure to competition, this is consistent with our theory. Alternatively, as competition
expectations might be adaptive such that firms expect on average their true future exposure
to competition, we also estimate our empirical model with future import competition and find
support for our hypothesis. Lastly, we exploit the removal of the possibility of the US Congress to
protect US industries with higher non-MFN tariffs vis-à-vis China after China’s WTO accession
as an expectation shock in future foreign competition.14
Besides changes in the effective market size, we are likely to capture an additional competition
effect: when competition decreases current (and potentially also future) profits, firms might face a
higher likelihood of insolvency in the future as their funds might not cover the claims by creditors.
This lower probability of survival might also reduce the return on long-term investments and
therefore induce a shift towards short-term assets.15 We address this alternative mechanism by
controlling for changes in the probability of firm survival. We follow the finance literature and
construct an empirical proxy for each firm’s distance to insolvency based on its equity volatility.
Atkeson et al. (2013) derive from canonical structural models of credit risk, that the inverse of
a firm’s equity volatility is an upper bound of the true structural distance from firm insolvency.
Moreover, they show that this bound is tight if creditors quickly force insolvent firms to default.
13β1 = [ln (k)− ln (z)]
△comp>0 − [ln (k)− ln (z)]△comp=0
14We postpone the discussion of the experiment to subsection 3.6.
15Garicano and Steinwender (2016) quantify this effect in light of the Great Recession.
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We use their measure to proxy for a changing probability of firm survival in order to differentiate
the competition effect from the survival effect.
Throughout all estimation equations the within-firm identification strategy allows for a clean
identification of the effect of competition on investments as potential firm-specific demand and
supply shocks that symmetrically affect investment categories are captured by the firm-year fixed
effects. Therefore, the specification mainly requires to control for investment determinants that
vary at the firm or sector level and differentially affect a firm’s short- and long-term investments.
Firm Heterogeneity
Transferring our approach to firm size and its impact on the effect of import competition on firm
investments, we obtain a triple difference specification of the following form
ln (Iisct) = β0 + β2 × ln (ImpCompst)× Short-Termc × Sizei +X′isctζ + λc + λit + εisct. (10)
The coefficient β2 measures the distortion created by competition and its differential impact
across the firm size distribution.16 Again, the specification makes use of investment category
as well as firm-year fixed effects such that identification rests upon variation across investment
types within firm-year combinations. According to Prediction 2 we expect import competition to
have a more negative influence on short-term relative to long-term investments for larger firms.
Thus, our coefficient of interest is expected to be negative (β2 < 0) in order to be in line with
the theoretical prediction.
3.2 Data
We employ data on the population of listed manufacturing firms in the US for the years 1995
- 2009. The firms in our sample are obtained from the CRSP database. We match all CUSIP
identifiers in the CRSP database for firms with a primary US SIC industry code between 2000 and
3999 with firm-level information from the Compustat and the Worldscope databases. Overall,
we end up with 4,428 stock market listed manufacturing firms in our sample.
16β2 =
{











Measuring Firm Investment and Size
We follow the approach suggested by Garicano and Steinwender (2016) and exploit expenditures
on Advertising, Computer Equipment, R&D, Transportation Equipment, Machinery Equipment
as well as on Buildings and Land. Garicano and Steinwender (2016) assign the following de-
preciation rates to these investments based on a survey of the accounting literature to proxy
for Short-Termc:
17 60% for Advertising, 30% for Computer Equipment, 20% for R&D, 16%
for Transportation Equipment, 12% for Machinery, 3% for Buildings and 0% for Land. Besides
using these explicit depreciation rates, we also employ a simple ranking that orders the invest-
ments from the most long-term one (Land with a durability rank of 1) to the most short-term
one (Advertising with a durability rank of 7). Tables 9 - 11 in the Data Appendix summarize
information on the investment data.
To explore the second empirical prediction, we use three different measures of firm size (Sizei):
a firm’s total assets, employment and sales. Since firm size responds endogenously to the level of
investments, we hold firm size constant throughout all our estimations and construct firm-specific
averages over the years 1995 - 1999, winsorized at the top 1%.
Measuring Foreign Competition and Trade Exposure




Prodst + Impst − Expst
, (11)
where Impst and Expst represent the value of total US imports and exports at the 3-digit US
SIC level derived from UN Comtrade data. Prodst reflects the value of US domestic shipments
at the 3-digit US SIC level taken from the NBER CES manufacturing database. Along the same
lines we compute a sector’s share of export in domestic consumption
ExpMarketst =
Expst
Prodst + Impst − Expst
. (12)
17Note that an investment’s depreciation rate is the inverse of its time to payoff in years.
14
Finally, the sectoral degree of openness is given by the ratio of the sum of total US imports and





We implicitly assume that all firms within an industry are subject to the same level of foreign
competition as well as export market exposure and openness.
Firm and Sector Level Controls
Two alternative channels that can have an impact on the investment composition at the firm-
level are changes in financial constraints and changes in the degree of uncertainty faced by firms.
To control for changes in financial constraints, we use firms’ current ratio, external financial
dependence as well as capital cost. Since trade liberalization can also be associated with an
increase in the degree of uncertainty or a higher probability of insolvency, we use the inverse
of the annualized equity volatility to proxy for variation in the firms’ distance to insolvency as
suggested by Atkeson et al. (2013). Table 11 provides a detailed definition of these and the
following variables.
Moreover, firms’ investment composition as well as the level of foreign competition might be
affected by sector specific attributes. If import competition is primarily traced back to low-
wage countries such as China, the factor proportions framework predicts firms in capital or skill
intensive sectors to be relatively less affected than their counterparts in labor or low-skill intensive
industries. Furthermore, trade exposure might be related to trends in technology adoption which
alter the demand for skill and capital and determine sector specific productivity. We therefore use
the capital stock per worker and the share of non-production worker wages in total compensation
in order to control for capital and skill intensity at the sector level. We also control for sector
specific productivity using a 5-factor total factor productivity index. The entire set of industry
level controls is obtained from the NBER CES manufacturing database.
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3.3 Baseline Results
Table 1 presents our main results from estimating equation (9). In panel A we use the simple
ordering as our measure of duration. The ordering of categories follows the ordering of deprecia-
tion rates and ranges from 1 (Land) to 7 (Advertising). Panel B repeats all specifications using
absolute depreciation rates from the literature as a measure of duration. By offering two distinct
measures we aim to ensure that our results do not hinge on specific assumptions regarding the
duration of investments, except for a broad ordering. We will show that our story goes through
irrespective of the measure chosen.
In discussing our results, we will focus on the sign of the interaction between import competition
and duration in a log-log specification, allowing us to compare how long-term investments react
relative to short-term investments (both measured in percentage terms), when sector level import
competition is increasing by one percent. According to Prediction 1, if import competition
induces firms to shift their investments towards less durable categories, we expect our coefficient
of interest β1 to be positive. This implies that higher import competition is associated on average
with a relative shift of investments towards more short-term categories, i.e. categories with a
higher rate of depreciation.
All specifications include our measure of interest and combinations of category, category-year,
firm, year or firm-year fixed investments. We correct for two-way clustered standard errors
throughout all specifications. We cluster at the firm-level and additionally, we cluster at the
industry-year level, as our measure of import competition is the same for all firms in a given
industry and in a given year. The level of import competition is sector-year specific and thus
absorbed by firm-year fixed effects. Thus, we do not identify the average effect of import com-
petition on investments when including firm-year fixed effects. Similarly, due to the inclusion of
category fixed effects, we do not identify the between-category differences in average investments.
We include these fixed effects because they allow us to effectively control for alternative channels
that otherwise would potentially be confounding our results. For example, sectors and firms will
be exposed to temporary shocks that, on average, will have an impact on investments. Think
about a domestic demand shock that reduces the demand for durable consumer goods. Poten-
tially, this demand shock will be correlated with our sectoral measure of import competition.
In response to the shock, firms in the durable goods sector might reduce average investments.
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Because this decision is due to the demand shock and independent of investment durations, the
relative composition of short and long-term investments within firms and industries would remain
constant. Nevertheless, our coefficient of interest might falsely pick up the variation if the invest-
ment composition in the durable goods sector happens to be on average more long-term than in
other sectors. The uniform investment reduction in the durable goods sector would then shift the
economy-wide investment composition towards more short run investments. Consequently, we
would find a positive coefficient on the durability interaction and wrongly conclude that import
competition was causing firms to invest more short-term. The inclusion of firm-year fixed effects
will account for these confounding effects at the firm or sectoral level, as long as the change in
investments is uniform across the different types of investment.
Insert Table 1 about here
In specification (1), we include firm, year and investment fixed effects. In line with the theory,
tougher foreign competition is associated with lower investments. Furthermore, this effect is
more pronounced for relatively long-term assets.
In specifications (2) to (6), we include firm-year fixed effects. These fixed effect specifications
imply that identification, as well as potential confounding effects, all hinge on factors that vary
across firms, years and investment categories. In specification (2), only the interaction of im-
port competition with duration fulfills this requirement. No other controls are included. The
coefficient is positive as predicted for both measures of depreciation but significant only for the
ordered measure.
The problem with specification (2) is that a lot of systematic variation across the three dimensions
is now potentially projected on the import channel. Thus, other sectoral developments with a
direct impact on investment composition might interfere with our results provided that they are
correlated with import competition. We therefore add interactions of the depreciation measure
with the firm’s distance to insolvency and various sector-level controls in specifications (3) to
(5).
In specification (3), we add an interaction with our firm-level proxy of distance to insolvency. This
is supposed to disentangle the import competition effect proposed in the theoretical framework
from other effects due to a changed probability of firm survival or uncertainty. The coefficient for
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the interaction with our firm-level proxy of distance to insolvency is negative but only significant
for the ordering measure. This is consistent with the results from Garicano and Steinwender
(2016) who find that a lower probability of firm survival (smaller distance to insolvency) is asso-
ciated with a shift towards relatively short-term investments. When we include the interaction
with our firm-level proxy of distance to insolvency in columns (3) and (5), the size of our co-
efficient of interest β1 somewhat decreases, suggesting that tougher import competition might
affect investment composition in part due to a lower survival probability. However, as the order
of magnitude of our coefficient of interest β1 remains comparable and mostly significant, we
conclude that import competition must have an impact on investment composition other than
through changes in firms’ probability of survival.
In column (4), we include sector-level controls. Specifically, we interact depreciation with time-
varying measures of capital intensity, skill intensity and a tfp index. The import competition
coefficient remains positive and now turns significant for both measures of depreciation.
Specification (5) is our preferred specification, where we include interactions with distance to
insolvency and the sector-level controls. Consider the following example in order to understand
the meaning of our coefficients: a higher level of import competition creates a wedge between
investments into different investment categories. Suppose for example that the level of import
competition increases by 10%. Then our coefficient in panel A implies that this wedge is equal to
0.342%. Thus, if an exemplary firm reduces its land investments (the most long-term category)
by 10%, we would expect that firm to reduce its investments in buildings by 9.66%, its machinery
investments by 9.32%, its transportation investments by 8.97%, its R&D investments by 8.63%,
its computer investments by 8.29% and its advertising investments (the most short-term category)
by 7.95%.
To evaluate the economic significance of our estimates, we invoke a simple thought experiment.
We consider the average increase in import competition over the sample period 1995-2009, i.e.
60% over the 15-year period. Additionally, we assume that Land investments respond inelastically
to an import competition shock.18 Using the results from Table 1, panel B, specification (5), we
can then calculate the change in the average depreciation rate that results from the increase in
18When regressing import competition on Land investments and adding firm and year fixed effects, we find
Land investments to be inelastic with respect to import competition.
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import competition.19 Our estimates suggest that the average increase in import competition
by 60% during our sample period has reduced the lifespan of firm assets by 71 days on average,
which corresponds to 4.5% of the average asset lifespan. Presuming a refinancing rate of 3%, this
would impose an additional interest cost of 6$ for each 1000$ invested. Thus, import competition
is associated with a significant shift towards relatively short-term investments.
In specification (6), we include category-year fixed effects instead of category fixed effects in order
to control for investment specific time trends.20 Our coefficient of interest remains significant
and slightly increases.
3.4 Firm Heterogeneity
In our theoretical framework we show that the import competition effect on investment compo-
sition should be less pronounced for more productive firms as these firms have larger markups
and less elastic residual demand. Since firm size and productivity are isomorph in our theoretical
framework and since firm size is a good proxy for residual demand elasticity, we study the effect
of foreign competition on investments for firms with different sizes.21
Insert Table 2 about here
In Table 2, we confront Prediction 2 with the data, using a triple interaction with measures of
firm size in order to see whether the effect of import competition on investment composition
varies along the firm size distribution. We use total employment, net firm sales and total as-
sets as measures of size. Adding the size interactions increases the coefficient on the original
interaction (β1) compared to the baseline. The interaction remains significant at the 1% level
in all specifications. The triple interaction with size has the expected negative sign in all spec-
ifications, implying that the shift towards short-term investments is less pronounced for larger
firms. Statistically, the effect is significant at the 1% level for total assets, independent of the
depreciation measure chosen. The effects are less significant for sales and employment and on
average stronger when we use the depreciation rate as our measure of duration. Using assets as
19See the Data Appendix for details on this calculation.
20As Figure 5 suggests, there is for example an upward trend in R&D expenditures over time.
21Based on survey data, Atkin et al. (2015) provide recent evidence for a positive relationship of the level of
mark-ups and firm size. They therefore consider firm size to be the best proxy for the productivity parameter in
heterogeneous firm models based on Melitz (2003).
19
a measure of size, the coefficients for the depreciation rank imply that for any two neighboring
investment categories, a 10% higher import competition is associated with a 0.4% higher de-
crease in the long-term investment compared to the neighboring shorter-term investment for the
median firm. Using an analogous back-of-the-envelope calculation as in the baseline with respect
to the estimates from panel B, we compare a firm at the 10th percentile with a firm at the 90th
percentile of the firm size distribution (in terms of assets). We find that the lifespan of assets
decreases by about 17 days more in the small firm.
3.5 Robustness and Alternative Channels
In the following subsection, we assess the robustness of our baseline results.
Current and Future Import Competition
In our theory, firms adjust their investments due to expected changes in future competition as this
differentially affects the return on long- and short-term investments. Since we do not observe
firms’ expectations about competition in the future and since changes in the level of import
competition are very persistent in our data, we used the current level of foreign competition as
a proxy in our baseline estimations. Alternatively, we exploit changes in future levels of import
competition in Table 3. The idea here is that firms might on average anticipate their future
exposure to foreign competition correctly, i.e. firm expectations are rational. Without making a
claim on how firms form their expectations we want to explore whether our baseline results also
hold when we exploit variation of import competition in the future.
Insert Table 3 about here
Specification (1) repeats our preferred specification from the baseline results in Table 1. In
columns (2) to (4), we alternatively use the 1-, 3-, or 5-years ahead value of import competition
instead of the current exposure for import competition. The coefficient of interest remains
positive and significant throughout these specifications. Interestingly, the size of the coefficient
increases when we use values for import competition in the more distant future, suggesting that
the wedge between investments becomes larger when competition changes in the long-run. In
column (5), we combine the current value of import competition with the 3-years ahead value of
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import competition. While the coefficient for the current value of import competition becomes
negative yet insignificant, the coefficient for future import competition remains positive and
becomes larger compared to specification (3). The coefficient is significant for the interaction
with the ordering measure suggesting that future changes in foreign competition have indeed an
effect on firms’ investment composition today, even after controlling for the highly correlated
level of import competition today.
Differentiating between Import Competition and Market Access
In subsection 2.5 in the theory, we argue that higher market access should have effects exactly
opposed to the effects of import competition. Table 4 addresses this point. Because better
market access implies higher demand in the future, we would expect firms to shift investments
towards this future market. Accordingly, the results for import competition documented so far
are probably biased in the opposite direction.
Specification (2) shows that our assumptions regarding the market access effects are confirmed in
the data. When regressing investments on the interaction of depreciation with export market size,
our estimates suggest that firms are shifting investments towards long-term categories when faced
with better export opportunities. These effects for exports are highly significant. In specification
(3) we add the export market interaction to the baseline specification to see how our original
results are affected. Stable signs indicate that the impact of both imports and exports remain
as the theory would predict. The increase in size of our coefficient of interest shows that failing
to control for export opportunities biases our coefficient on import competition in the opposite
direction.22 Given these findings, we consider our previous results to represent a conservative
estimate of the actual effect. Finally, in specification (4) we use an openness measure that
incorporates both import competition and export opportunities and find that mixing up the two
effects conceals much of the impact trade has on investment composition. Because the coefficient
remains positive and significant for the ordering measure, we conclude that import competition
might have slightly outweighed the effect of export opportunities for the firms in our sample.
Insert Table 4 about here
22The same holds vice versa for export opportunities.
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Import Competition and Foreign Inputs
A larger exposure to imports can also affect firm investments by allowing to buy cheaper inter-
mediate inputs and offshore parts of their production chain. Since input industries are often close
to the firms’ output industries, our measure of import competition could in part also capture
a larger supply of foreign input goods. In Table 5, we aim to disentangle the effect of tougher
competition from effects that arise due to an increased supply in foreign inputs. We investigate
this by adapting the offshoring measure suggested by Feenstra and Hanson (1999), which uses
the input-output tables to measure for each industry the share of input industries. Specifically,
our proxy for offshoring is
Offshoringst =
ImpInputsst
Prodst + ImpInputsst − Expst
, (14)
where ImpInputsst are the imported inputs by industry s in year t and constructed as proposed
by Feenstra and Hanson (1999) using input-output tables from the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis. In column (2), we include the interaction of the measures of asset depreciation with
the offshoring variable instead of the foreign competition variable. We do not find that offshoring
significantly affects the investment composition within firms. In order to differentiate the effect
of import competition from confounding effects due to larger input supply, we include both
interaction terms in specification (3). While our coefficient of interest β1 remains significantly
positive, the coefficient for the interaction term with offshoring is negative and significant at the
10 percent level when using the depreciation rate as a measure of asset depretiation.
Insert Table 5 about here
Financial Constraints
In Table 6 we try to rule out some alternative stories that relate to the financial constraints that
firms face and that might affect our results. Shocks to credit supply or the cost of obtaining
(long-term) credit could alter the relative return of long-term investments. Since we want to
identify the effect of competition, we need to make sure that time varying financial characteris-
tics are properly controlled for. In column (2), we add an interaction of the depreciation measure
with the firms’ current ratio in order to control for differences in firm liquidity. Specification
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(3) includes an interaction of the depreciation measure with the firms’ external dependence, i.e.
the fraction of capital expenditures that are not financed by internal capital flows. Specification
(4) interacts the depreciation measure with capital costs and specification (5) interacts the de-
preciation measure with a financial crisis dummy that indicates the years from 2007 until 2009.
While some of these controls appear to have an effect on the investment composition, the results
for our measure of import competition are not significantly altered. We therefore conclude that
import competition is not just working through changes in firms’ financial characteristics and
probably better explained by changes in demand.
Insert Table 6 about here
Reordering and Omitting Investment Categories
In order to determine whether our results hinge on the assumed ordering of investment categories
in terms of depreciation rates, we omit and regroup various categories for the ordered measure of
depreciation in Table 7.23 Specification (1) repeats our baseline regression. In specification (2)
we omit investments into R&D in order to see whether R&D expenses are driving our result. For
example, a rise in import competition might lead firms to foster innovation by investing more
heavily in research activities.24 This decision is independent of the duration of R&D investments,
but would still render our coefficient positive because R&D expenditures just happen to be
classified as relatively short-term. The inclusion of category fixed effects does not help us against
this type of disturbances, as the unobservable effect varies over time and industries. Omitting
R&D investments reduces the number of observations by more than a quarter and diminishes the
size of our coefficient. But our results remain robust at the 5% level of significance, indicating
that R&D is an important, but not the only driver of our results.
In specification (3) we further omit investments in Advertising. Because different from the other
categories, both R&D and Advertising expenses are taken from the income statements rather
than being derived from asset data, one concern is that our results are due to these constructional
differences. The results in specification (3) show that our results go through when restricting
the sample to asset data. Specification (4) omits Transportation and Computer investments.
23Specifications (1) to (5) are robust to using the depreciation rate instead.
24Bloom et al. (2016) show that Chinese import competition increases technical change within firms, among
other things, by increasing the amount of R&D.
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Computer investments are reported only for the years 1999 and onwards and Transportation is
reported very little over the full range of years. Accordingly, these two categories might not be
very representative and specifically prone to be affected by outliers. But again, our results remain
robust when estimating the equation for the remaining categories. Specification (5) omits Land
and Building investments as these are investment categories for which prices are very sensitive
to market shocks.25 Therefore, it is not clear whether price changes or quantity changes trigger
a change in that investment category and we exclude those categories. However, our coefficent
remains significantly positive and increases in magnitude.
Insert Table 7 about here
Since estimates of depreciation rates vary in the literature, we regroup assets that are close to
each other into single categories in specifications (6) to (9). In specification (6), we assign the
same rank to Land, Buildings and Machinery. R&D and Computer investments are grouped into
another category. The coefficient almost doubles in size and remains highly significant. Adding
Transportation to the group of long-term investments in specification (7) further increases the
coefficient, confirming that switching from one rank to another now has a higher impact on
investment duration. Because the depreciation rate of Transportation is relatively close also to
R&D and Computer investments, specification (8) assigns it into one group with these categories.
Again, our results are not significantly altered.
Finally, it could be that firms increase research expenditures in order to remain competitive in
the future, rendering R&D effectively a long-term investment. Then our ranking of investment
categories would be flawed. Specification (9) therefore ranks R&D as the most long-term invest-
ment. Our effect vanishes and we conclude that our original ordering is more coherent, given
that R&D investments are not the sole driver of our results.
3.6 The Impact of China’s WTO Accession on the Composition of Firm
Investments in the US
In order to substantiate our claim that it is the surge in expected imports that induces a reallo-
cation of investments towards long-term investments, we will exploit a quasi-natural experiment
25Consider for example the subprime crisis as an extreme example for such a market shock.
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based on the large competition effect caused by China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. China’s
WTO accession is a useful experiment to test our theory for mainly three reasons.
First, Autor et al. (2016) argue that China’s comparative advantage in industrial goods implies
that China’s growth resulted primarily in a large supply shock for manufacturing goods and
a large demand shock for raw materials. Given that US imports from China vastly exceeded
US exports to China, this suggests that our identification strategy is likely going to capture
manufacturing import competition rather than export potential.26
Second, China’s accession to the WTO, and the dramatic increase of exports to the world that
followed thereafter,27 was driven mostly by the change in China’s internal conditions and not by
the rising import demand of receiving countries. As Autor et al. (2013) point out, this interpreta-
tion is corroborated by the fact that China had an average annual TFP growth in manufacturing
of 8% during that time, compared to only 3.9% for the US. Autor et al. (2016) cite several
studies indicating that the prospect of formal WTO accession was a major force stimulating
a the underlying restructuring of the manufacturing industry. The increasing privatization of
public enterprises, the extension of trading rights for private firms, greater access to imported
intermediates and a solidification of the MFN status, providing security to Chinese exporters,
all helped to foster a new level of productivity growth after 2001. Thus, although China had
already been granted most-favored nation status (MFN) during the 80s, the surge in exports
significantly accelerated after 2001. This surge can be treated as mostly exogenous to dynamics
in the US market which is crucial for identification.28
Third, as noted by Pierce and Schott (2016), the change in China’s WTO membership status in
2001 had an effect that, in line with our theoretical framework, allows us to effectively interpret
China’s WTO accession as fundamental shock to firm expectations, reducing the dependence of
our results on actual imports. Namely, it ended the uncertainty associated with the requirement
of annual extensions of China’s MFN status. Even before China was granted permanent MFN
status in 2001, it was subject to the same tariff rates that applied to other member countries.
However, according to US law, these tariff rates required annual approval by the US Congress.
26Bloom et al. (2016), Iacovone et al. (2013) and Utar (2014) also use the WTO accession of China as a natural
experiment for an increase in import competition.
27Between 2000 and 2007, the low-income country share of US imports almost doubled from 15 to 28%, with
China accounting for 89% of this growth. Compare Autor et al. (2013). Additionally, see Figure 6 in the Data
Appendix for the average share of imports from China in total US imports for the industries in our sample.
28See Iacovone et al. (2013) for a similar argument.
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Pierce and Schott (2016) document that between 1990 and 2001, the average vote in the Congress
against renewal of China’s MFN status was 38 percent. If China had lost its MFN status, tariff
rates would have increased to a much higher non-MFN tariff schedule. After China was granted
WTO membership in 2001, this probability of higher protectionism due to an abolishment of the
MFN status was omitted and China was granted a permanent MFN status. We argue that this
led to an increase in the expected exposure to competition from China, as domestic industries
effectively had lost the option to fight China’s MFN status through Congress.29
We argue that this loss of an opportunity to seize protectionist actions was especially important
for industries that were traditionally shielded from foreign competition. Therefore, we use the
average US tariff level on Chinese imports by industry during the period preceding the WTO
accession of China as our treatment variable for affected industries. Technically, this approach
is related to Guadalupe and Wulf (2010). Specifically, we use the US effectively applied import
tariff vis-à-vis China, averaged over the years 1995 to 1999 and specific to firms within US SIC
three digit industries.30
Our econometric specification is given by
ln (Iisct) = β0+β3×Post2000t×Pre-WTO-Tariffs×Short-Termc+X′isctζ+λc+λit+εisct. (15)
Post2000t is a dummy variable equal to one for years within the panel which succeed China’s
WTO entry. Pre-WTO-Tariffs represents the average US tariff level on Chinese imports by
industry between 1995 and 1999. The coefficient of interest is the interaction of a post-2000
dummy with the pre-trade-agreement level of tariffs and our proxy for the duration of an invest-
ment category (β3). Again, we expect the coefficient of interest β3 to be positive. By exploiting
the competition effect triggered by China’s WTO accession as a quasi-natural experiment, we
aim to provide evidence of capturing a causal and economically significant effect.
Accordingly, we look at the differential change in investment behavior before and after the
Chinese WTO accession in 2001, assuming that the threat of tariff reductions is larger in high-
29Pierce and Schott (2016) also point out that China’s WTO membership still led to a substantial reduction
in expected US imports tariffs on Chinese goods. Interestingly, actual tariffs remained relatively stable from the
year 2000 onward (see Figure 7).
30The effectively applied tariff is defined as the lowest available tariff, given by preferential tariffs if existent
and MFN tariffs otherwise.
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tariff industries.31 In our baseline specifications, we restrict our sample period to the years from
2000 to 2002. This minimizes the effect of actual imports and shifts the focus to a change in
expectations. We show that the results become actually smaller when broadening the time frame
by two years (1999 to 2003) and allowing actual imports to play a larger role.
While we argue that the results we are going to present in this section represent a causal effect
of imports on the investment composition, we are aware that we cannot precisely determine the
channel through which imports are affecting the investment choices of firms. Thus, while we
claim that import competition is the driving force behind our results, part of the variation we
are using might be due to a rise in imported intermediates rather than final goods. Yet, note that
cheaper intermediates should have a positive effect on the future market potential of US firms
as seen before in Table 5. Thus, if the surge in US imports to China was driven by a surge in
intermediate imports, if anything, it would make it more difficult for us to detect a shift towards
short-term investments.
Insert Table 8 about here
Table 8 shows the results for the two measures of depreciation. Again, we allow errors to be
clustered at the firm level and include firm-year and category or category-year fixed effects in
all specifications. We further control for distance to insolvency in all columns of table 8. We
omit the time varying sector level controls due to the short time period under consideration but
results are robust to their inclusion. Specifications (1) and (2) restrict the sample period to one
year before till one year after China’s WTO accession. Specifications (3) and (4) extends the
sample period by two years. For each period, we show results with category or category-year
fixed effects respectively. The triple interaction of interest is significant at the 5% or 10% level in
all specifications, implying that the WTO accession of China led to a higher decrease (or lower
increase) in long-term investments, compared to short-term investments, and that this effect was
more pronounced in sectors that had higher average tariffs during the second half of the 1990s.32
Specifically, using the results from specification (3) in panel B, we find that for a firm at the 25th
31Note that this identifying assumption is corroborated by the fact that we find industries with pre-WTO
accession tariff levels above the median to have experienced a 66% larger increase in Chinese import competition
than industries with pre-WTO accession tariffs below the median for the years 1999 to 2003.
32Note that the negative coefficient on the interaction of our measure of depreciation with the post-2000 dummy
implies that on average firms invested relatively more long-term after 2000. This is a materialization of the general
trend towards more long-term investments over time which can be seen in Figure 3.
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percentile of our tariff measure, the average investment duration increased in the years after 2001
by roughly 168 days more than for firms at the 75th percentile of the pre-2000 tariff distribution.
4 Conclusion
This paper examines how the exposure to foreign competition affects the composition of short-
term relative to long-term investments within firms. In order to guide our empirical strategy, we
develop a stylized framework which illustrates the investment decision of a representative firm
with respect to short- and long-term investments. An increase in the toughness of competition
reduces the relative value of long-term investments and induces firms to shift their investment
composition towards short-term investments. The magnitude of this effect varies with firm size.
We test these predictions based on the population of listed US manufacturing firms by using
data on seven asset classes which we order according to their depreciation rates. Based on our
framework, the empirical strategy employs a difference-in-differences estimator. This approach
allows using firm-year fixed effects as well as investment category fixed effects in order to identify
the effect of trade induced competition on the composition of investments within firms. The
empirical results are in line with our predictions. Import competition shifts the composition of
investments towards more short-lived categories and the effect depends on firm size. Our results
are robust to the inclusion of controls that account for alternative channels at the firm and sector
level such as various measures of financial constraints and factor intensities. In order to provide
further supportive evidence of a causal effect, we exploit the rise in Chinese imports to the US
due to China’s accession to the WTO as quasi-natural experiment.
We believe that adjustments in the composition of investments can have important economic
implications. If trade induced competition incentivizes firms to disregard the long-term perspec-
tive this implies a loss in sustainability, higher financing costs as well as changes in the firm size
distribution. This suggests new research directions. Future research might for example study
how changes in the composition of investment relate to the welfare effects of globalization.
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Notes: The figure shows the average depreciation rate over the years for the firms in our sample. The
average is constructed by weighting each investment specific depreciation rate with its average investment
share across all firms in a specific year. Investment categories and assumed depreciation rates: Land (0%),
Buildings (3%), Machines (12%), Transportation (16%), R&D (20%) Computer (30%), Advertising (60%).
See the Data Appendix for a description how these average depreciation rates are calculated.
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Table 1: Baseline Results
Dependent Variable: log(Investment)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Measure of Depreciation: Ordering
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.0465*** 0.0455*** 0.0445*** 0.0353*** 0.0342*** 0.0363***
(0.00769) (0.00813) (0.00830) (0.00879) (0.00895) (0.00865)
log(ImpComp) -0.130***
(0.0380)
Distance to Insolvency * Depreciation -9.590*** -7.607*** -7.612***
(2.948) (2.779) (2.776)
Capital Intensity * Depreciation -0.000302*** -0.000316*** -0.000301***
(9.18e-05) (9.42e-05) (9.41e-05)
Skill Intensity * Depreciation 0.480*** 0.486*** 0.503***
(0.0610) (0.0617) (0.0606)
TFP * Depreciation -0.00897 -0.00653 -0.00720
(0.00912) (0.00943) (0.00939)
Panel B: Measure of Depreciation: Depreciation Rate
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.172** 0.143 0.141 0.250** 0.235** 0.283***
(0.0848) (0.0901) (0.0921) (0.0985) (0.101) (0.0978)
log(ImpComp) -0.0220
(0.0345)
Distance to Insolvency * Depreciation -30.24 -40.27 -41.92
(27.81) (26.33) (26.30)
Capital Intensity * Depreciation -0.00381*** -0.00401*** -0.00307***
(0.00102) (0.00106) (0.00111)
Skill Intensity * Depreciation 0.900 1.135 1.192*
(0.700) (0.719) (0.699)
TFP * Depreciation -0.348*** -0.319*** -0.317***
(0.106) (0.107) (0.107)
Investment FE yes yes yes yes yes no
Investment-Year FE no no no no no yes
Firm-Year FE no yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes no no no no no
Year FE yes no no no no no
Observations 95,222 89,735 81,708 89,436 81,430 81,427
Firm Clusters 3,657 3,533 3,356 3,521 3,343 3,343
Industry-Year Clusters 2,693 2,548 2,462 2,527 2,441 2,441
Notes: Investment categories and assumed depreciation rates: Land (0%), Buildings (3%), Machines
(12%), Transportation (16%), R&D (20%) Computer (30%), Advertising (60%). The ordering of cate-
gories resembles the ordering of depreciation rates. Investment expenses are either derived from balance
sheet data on assets (Land, Buildings, Machines, Transportation and Computer) or taken from the in-
come statement (R&D and Advertising). Import competition (ImpComp) are imports at the sectoral
level, relative to domestic production plus imports minus exports. Distance to Insolvency is the inverse
standard deviation of daily stock returns in a given year. Standard errors are twoway cluster-robust at
the firm and at the industry-year level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Measure of Depreciation: Ordering
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.0342*** 0.0404*** 0.0411*** 0.0409***
(0.00895) (0.00999) (0.00976) (0.00957)
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation * Size -0.000613 -3.40e-06* -3.35e-06***
(0.000391) (1.76e-06) (1.24e-06)
Depreciation * Size -0.000881 -3.49e-06 -5.31e-06
(0.000974) (4.05e-06) (3.47e-06)
Panel B: Measure of Depreciation: Depreciation Rate
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.235** 0.326*** 0.339*** 0.331***
(0.101) (0.111) (0.108) (0.107)
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation * Size -0.00726* -4.24e-05** -3.99e-05***
(0.00379) (1.87e-05) (1.22e-05)
Depreciation * Size 0.00145 1.37e-05 -1.54e-05
(0.0103) (4.60e-05) (3.53e-05)
Distance to Insolvency * Depreciation yes yes yes yes
Industry Controls * Depreciation yes yes yes yes
Investment FE yes yes yes yes
Firm-Year FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 81,430 72,739 75,181 75,263
Firm Clusters 3,343 2,732 2,852 2,856
Industry-Year Clusters 2,441 2,353 2,381 2,381
Notes: Investment categories and assumed depreciation rates: Land (0%), Buildings (3%), Machines
(12%), Transportation (16%), R&D (20%) Computer (30%), Advertising (60%). The ordering of cate-
gories resembles the ordering of depreciation rates. Investment expenses are either derived from balance
sheet data on assets (Land, Buildings, Machines, Transportation and Computer) or taken from the in-
come statement (R&D and Advertising). Import competition (ImpComp) are imports at the sectoral
level, relative to domestic production plus imports minus exports. Measures of size are from Compustat
and represent firm averages over the years 1995 to 1999. Industry controls contain controls for capital-
intensity, skill-intensity and tfp. Distance to Insolvency is the inverse standard deviation of daily stock
returns in a given year. Standard errors are twoway cluster-robust at the firm and at the industry-year
level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 3: Current and Future Import Competition
Dependent Variable: log(Investment)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Measure of Depreciation: Ordering
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.0342*** -0.0276
(0.00895) (0.0372)
log(ImpComp t+1) * Depreciation 0.0362***
(0.00909)
log(ImpComp t+3) * Depreciation 0.0381*** 0.0658*
(0.00940) (0.0378)
log(ImpComp t+5) * Depreciation 0.0395***
(0.00979)
Panel B: Measure of Depreciation: Depreciation Rate
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.235** -0.0628
(0.101) (0.341)
log(ImpComp t+1) * Depreciation 0.259**
(0.102)
log(ImpComp t+3) * Depreciation 0.284*** 0.347
(0.106) (0.344)
log(ImpComp t+5) * Depreciation 0.287**
(0.112)
Distance to Insolvency * Depreciation yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Controls * Depreciation yes yes yes yes yes
Investment FE yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 81,430 76,539 66,173 55,371 66,173
Firm Clusters 3,343 3,322 3,175 2,995 3,175
Industry-Year Clusters 2,441 2,297 2,007 1,704 2,007
Notes: Investment categories and assumed depreciation rates: Land (0%), Buildings (3%), Machines
(12%), Transportation (16%), R&D (20%) Computer (30%), Advertising (60%). The ordering of cate-
gories resembles the ordering of depreciation rates. Investment expenses are either derived from balance
sheet data on assets (Land, Buildings, Machines, Transportation and Computer) or taken from the in-
come statement (R&D and Advertising). Import competition (ImpComp) are imports at the sectoral
level, relative to domestic production plus imports minus exports. Industry controls contain controls
for capital-intensity, skill-intensity and tfp. Distance to Insolvency is the inverse standard deviation of
daily stock returns in a given year. Standard errors are twoway cluster-robust at the firm and at the
industry-year level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 4: Import Competition and Access to Foreign Markets
Dependent Variable: log(Investment)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Measure of Depreciation: Ordering
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.0342*** 0.0774***
(0.00895) (0.0121)
log(ExpMarket) * Depreciation -0.0339*** -0.0798***
(0.00908) (0.0116)
log(Openness) * Depreciation 0.0167***
(0.00638)
Panel B: Measure of Depreciation: Depreciation Rate
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.235** 0.647***
(0.101) (0.126)
log(ExpMarket) * Depreciation -0.496*** -0.854***
(0.0991) (0.115)
log(Openness) * Depreciation 0.0179
(0.0735)
Distance to Insolvency * Depreciation yes yes yes yes
Industry Controls * Depreciation yes yes yes yes
Investment FE yes yes yes yes
Firm-Year FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 81,430 81,430 81,430 81,430
Firm Clusters 3,343 3,343 3,343 3,343
Industry-Year Clusters 2,441 2,441 2,441 2,441
Notes: Investment categories and assumed depreciation rates: Land (0%), Buildings (3%), Machines
(12%), Transportation (16%), R&D (20%) Computer (30%), Advertising (60%). The ordering of cate-
gories resembles the ordering of depreciation rates. Investment expenses are either derived from balance
sheet data on assets (Land, Buildings, Machines, Transportation and Computer) or taken from the in-
come statement (R&D and Advertising). Import competition (ImpComp) are imports at the sectoral
level, relative to domestic production plus imports minus exports. Export market size (ExpMarket) are
exports at the sectoral level, relative to domestic production plus imports minus exports. Openness is
the sum of exports and imports at the sectoral level, relative to domestic production plus imports mi-
nus exports. Industry controls contain controls for capital-intensity, skill-intensity and tfp. Distance to
Insolvency is the inverse standard deviation of daily stock returns in a given year. Standard errors are
twoway cluster-robust at the firm and at the industry-year level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 5: Import Competition and Foreign Inputs
Dependent Variable: log(Investment)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Measure of Depreciation: Ordering
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.0342*** 0.0277***
(0.00895) (0.00935)
log(Offshoring) * Depreciation 0.0106 -0.0118
(0.0196) (0.0190)
Panel B: Measure of Depreciation: Depreciation Rate
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.235** 0.246**
(0.101) (0.111)
log(Offshoring) * Depreciation -0.166 -0.371*
(0.201) (0.198)
Distance to Insolvency * Depreciation yes yes yes
Industry Controls * Depreciation yes yes yes
Investment FE yes yes yes
Firm-Year FE yes yes yes
Observations 81,430 73,738 73,452
Firm Clusters 3,343 2,963 2,950
Industry-Year Clusters 2,441 1,619 1,592
Notes: Investment categories and assumed depreciation rates: Land (0%), Buildings (3%), Machines
(12%), Transportation (16%), R&D (20%) Computer (30%), Advertising (60%). The ordering of cate-
gories resembles the ordering of depreciation rates. Investment expenses are either derived from balance
sheet data on assets (Land, Buildings, Machines, Transportation and Computer) or taken from the in-
come statement (R&D and Advertising). Import competition (ImpComp) are imports at the sectoral
level, relative to domestic production plus imports minus exports. Offshoring is the level of import com-
petition at the input industry level; input industry shares are estimated on a similar basis to Feenstra and
Hanson (1999). Industry controls contain controls for capital-intensity, skill-intensity and tfp. Distance
to Insolvency is the inverse standard deviation of daily stock returns in a given year. Standard errors are
twoway cluster-robust at the firm and at the industry-year level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 6: Alternative Financial Channels
Dependent Variable: log(Investment)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Measure of Depreciation: Ordering
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.0342*** 0.0310*** 0.0330*** 0.0327*** 0.0343***
(0.00895) (0.00896) (0.00908) (0.00899) (0.00893)
Current Ratio * Depreciation 0.00970***
(0.00224)
External Dependence * Depreciation 0.000207**
(0.000102)
Capital Cost * Depreciation -0.195***
(0.0230)
Crisis * Depreciation -0.00394
(0.0200)
Panel B: Measure of Depreciation: Depreciation Rate
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.235** 0.234** 0.227** 0.220** 0.239**
(0.101) (0.1000) (0.102) (0.0997) (0.101)
Current Ratio * Depreciation -0.000736
(0.0247)
External Dependence * Depreciation 0.00150*
(0.000817)
Capital Cost * Depreciation -2.158***
(0.293)
Crisis * Depreciation -0.256
(0.203)
Distance to Insolvency * Depreciation yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Controls * Depreciation yes yes yes yes yes
Investment FE yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 81,430 78,653 78,551 78,558 81,430
Firm Clusters 3,343 3,218 3,218 3,220 3,343
Industry-Year Clusters 2,441 2,409 2,413 2,413 2,441
Notes: Investment categories and assumed depreciation rates: Land (0%), Buildings (3%), Machines
(12%), Transportation (16%), R&D (20%) Computer (30%), Advertising (60%). The ordering of cate-
gories resembles the ordering of depreciations rates. Investment expenses are either derived from balance
sheet data on assets (Land, Buildings, Machines, Transportation and Computer) or taken from the in-
come statement (R&D and Advertising). Import competition (ImpComp) are imports at the sectoral
level, relative to domestic production plus imports minus exports. Financial controls are time varying at
the firm level derived from Compustat: Current Ratio is the total of current assets over current liabilities,
External Dependence is capital expenditure net of EBIT over total capital expenditure, Capital Cost is
capital expenditure over total liabilities. Crisis is an indicator equal to 1 for the years 2007-2009. Industry
controls contain controls for capital-intensity, skill-intensity and tfp. Distance to Insolvency is the inverse
standard deviation of daily stock returns in a given year. Standard errors are twoway cluster-robust at
the firm and at the industry-year level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 7: Altering and Omitting Investment Categories
Dependent Variable: log(Investment)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Measure of Depreciation: Ordering
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.0342*** 0.0188** 0.0221* 0.0353*** 0.0433*** 0.0679*** 0.108*** 0.0937*** -0.0170*
(0.00895) (0.00936) (0.0128) (0.00919) (0.0154) (0.0163) (0.0277) (0.0269) (0.00916)
Distance to Insolvency * Depreciation yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Controls * Depreciation yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Investment FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Excluded Categories none R&D R&D / Transportation / Land / none none none none
Advertising Computer Buildings
Number of Categories 7 6 5 5 5 4 3 3 7*
Observations 81,430 58,140 49,271 76,376 48,174 81,430 81,430 81,430 81,430
Firm Clusters 3,343 2,916 2,707 3,290 2,959 3,343 3,343 3,343 3,343
Industry-Year Clusters 2,441 2,369 2,310 2,400 2,155 2,441 2,441 2,441 2,441
Notes: Investment categories and assumed depreciation rates: Land (0%), Buildings (3%), Machines (12%), Transportation (16%), R&D (20%) Computer
(30%), Advertising (60%). The ordering of categories resembles the ordering of depreciation rates in specification (1)-(5). Specification (6) groups Land,
Buildings and Machinery into one category and R&D and Computer into another. Specification (7) additionally takes Transportation into the category
with Land, Buildings and Machinery, while specification (8) takes it into the category with R&D and Computer. In specification (9), R&D is ordered
as the most long-term investment. Investment expenses are either derived from balance sheet data on assets (Land, Buildings, Machines, Transportation
and Computer) or taken from the income statement (R&D and Advertising). Import competition (ImpComp) are imports at the sectoral level, relative to
domestic production plus imports minus exports. Industry controls contain controls for capital-intensity, skill-intensity and tfp. Distance to Insolvency is
the inverse standard deviation of daily stock returns in a given year. Standard errors are twoway cluster-robust at the firm and at the industry-year level.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 8: The Impact of China’s WTO Accession
Dependent Variable: log(Investment)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Measure of Depreciation: Ordering
Post2000 * Pre-WTO-Tariff * Depreciation 0.00798** 0.00940** 0.00540* 0.00730**
(0.00403) (0.00408) (0.00299) (0.00303)
Pre-WTO-Tariff * Depreciation 0.00223 0.00126 0.00510 0.00391
(0.00432) (0.00429) (0.00349) (0.00345)
Post2000 * Depreciation -0.0227 -0.0284**
(0.0171) (0.0140)
Panel B: Measure of Depreciation: Depreciation Rate
Post2000 * Pre-WTO-Tariff * Depreciation 0.0776** 0.0826** 0.0547* 0.0608**
(0.0352) (0.0353) (0.0283) (0.0283)
Pre-WTO-Tariff * Depreciation 0.0747* 0.0712* 0.106*** 0.102***
(0.0394) (0.0393) (0.0337) (0.0335)
Post2000 * Depreciation -0.420** -0.563***
(0.171) (0.153)
Distance to Insolvency * Depreciation yes yes yes yes
Investment FE yes no yes no
Investment-Year FE no yes no yes
Firm-Year FE yes yes yes yes
Sample Time 2000 - 2002 2000 - 2002 1999 - 2003 1999 - 2003
Observations 16,537 16,535 27,651 27,648
Firm Clusters 2,091 2,091 2,403 2,403
Notes: Investment categories and assumed depreciation rates: Land (0%), Buildings (3%), Machines
(12%), Transportation (16%), R&D (20%) Computer (30%), Advertising (60%). The ordering of cate-
gories resembles the ordering of depreciation rates. Investment expenses are either derived from balance
sheet data on assets (Land, Buildings, Machines, Transportation and Computer) or taken from the in-
come statement (R&D and Advertising). Sample period 1999-2003. Post2000 is an indicator that takes
the value 1 if the year is 2001 or later. Pre-WTO-Tariff is the simple industry average (over the years
1995-2000) of the effectively applied tariff on US imports from China as reported in the WITS/Comtrade
data base. Distance to Insolvency is the inverse standard deviation of daily stock returns in a given year.
Standard errors are cluster-robust at the firm level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Appendix A: Data














Notes: Applied depreciation rates are obtained from Garicano and Steinwender (2016) who derive the
investment-specific depreciation rates from various sources of the accounting literature.
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Table 10: Selected Summary Statistics
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. = 0
Firm-Year Level
advertising investments (millions USD) 41,351 358.1 1,618.7 0 53,775.0 2
computer investments (millions USD) 4,404 7.1 27.8 0 776.9 13
R&D investments (millions USD) 33,620 89.5 460.3 0 10,611.0 3,748
transportation equipment investments (millions USD) 4,758 1.6 18.3 0 1,088.5 1,497
machinery investments (millions USD) 30,287 81.8 429.3 0 43,764.8 27
building investments (millions USD) 22,013 38.9 173.3 0 11,104.6 258
land investments (millions USD) 18,258 6.7 66.5 0 7,150.9 289
distance to insolvency 32,413 0.06 0.002 0.0010 0.09
current ratio 39,981 3.72 6.30 0.0000 503.31
external dependence 17,610 53.77 493.17 0.0002 33683.50
capital costs 39,879 0.15 0.50 0.0000 81.06
Firm Level
avg. employment (thousands) 3,090 4.1 11.0 0 76.3
avg. sales (millions USD) 3,221 826.4 2,440.8 0 16,807.8
avg. assets (millions USD) 3,225 866.3 2,809.2 0 21,122.8
Industry-Year Level
import competition 3,434 0.3 1.3 0.0001 49.4
export market exposure 3,434 0.2 1.3 0.0002 48.4
offshoring 1,851 0.3 0.2 0.0063 2.6
capital intensity 3,432 154.9 193.3 8.74 1,450.5
skill intensity 3,432 0.4 0.1 0.17 0.9
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Table 11: Variable Descriptions and Data Sources
Variable: Description: Source:
Firm Investments
advertisingit advertising represents the cost of advertising media (i.e., radio, television, and
periodicals) and promotional expenses in millions USD; Compustat variable name: XAD
Compustat
computerit computer software & equipment (period t) - 0.95 × computer software & equipment
(period t− 1); computer software & equipment (gross property plant and equipment)
represents computer equipment and the information a computer uses to perform tasks in
millions USD
Worldscope
R&Dit research & development expenses (period t) represent all direct and indirect costs related
to the creation and development of new processes, techniques, applications and products
with commercial possibilities in millions USD
Worldscope
transportation equipmentit transportation equipment (period t) - 0.95 × transportation equipment (period t− 1);
transportation equipment (gross property plant and equipment) represents the cars, ships,
planes or any other type of transportation equipment in millions USD
Worldscope
machinesit machinery & equipment (period t) - 0.95 × machinery & equipment (period t− 1);
machinery & equipment (gross property plant and equipment) represent the machines
and machine parts needed by the company to produce its products in millions USD
Worldscope
buildingsit buildings (period t) - 0.95 × buildings (period t− 1); buildings (gross property plant and
equipment) represent the architectural structure used in a business such as a factory,
office complex or warehouse in millions USD
Worldscope
landit land (period t) - 0.95 × land (period t− 1); land (gross property plant and equipment)
represents the real estate without buildings held for productive use, is recorded at its
purchase price plus any costs related to its purchase such as lawyer’s fees, escrow fees,
title and recording fees in millions USD
Worldscope
Firm Controls
employmenti average firm employment in thousands over the years 1995-1999, winsorized at the top
1%; Compustat variable name: EMP
Compustat
salesi average firm sales in millions USD over the years 1995-1999, winsorized at the top 1%;
Compustat variable name: SALE
Compustat
assetsi average firm assets in millions USD over the years 1995-1999, winsorized at the top 1%;
Compustat variable name: AT
Compustat
current ratioit current ratio is an indication of a firm’s market liquidity and ability to meet creditor’s
demands; defined as current assets divided by current liabilities during a given year t
(banker’s rule: >2 for creditworthiness); Compustat variable names: ACT/LCT
Compustat
external dependenceit external dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures that are not financed by
internal capital flows during a given year t; Compustat variable names:
(CAPX− EBIT)/CAPX
Compustat
capital costit capital cost is defined as capital expenditures over liabilities during a given year t;
Compustat variable names: CAPX/LT
Compustat




252 (252 is the average number of trading days
per year) during a given year t; based on Atkeson et al. (2013)
CRSP
Trade Variables
import competitionst ImpComp is defined as
ImpComp = importsWorld/
(
domestic shipments+ importsWorld − exportsWorld
)
; at
the 3-digit US SIC level during a given year t




export market exposurest ExpMarket is defined as
ExpMarket = exportsWorld/
(
domestic shipments+ importsWorld − exportsWorld
)
; at
the 3-digit US SIC level during a given year t




opennessst Openness is defined as Openness = (exports
World + importsWorld)/domestic shipments;
at the 3-digit US SIC level during a given year t




pre-WTO tariffs simple industry average tariff over the years 1995-2000 of the effectively applied US tariff
on imports from China; at the 3-digit US SIC level
UN Comtrade
offshoringst Offshoring is defined as Offshoring =
input importsWorld/
(
domestic shipments+ input importsWorld − exportsWorld
)
; at the
3-digit US SIC level during a given year t; input importsWorld are defined as the weighted
average of imports, where weights are constructed using a input-output table following
Feenstra and Hanson (1999)
NBER CES data for
vship, UN Comtrade
for exports and
imports, US BEA for
input-output table
Industry Controls
capital-intensityst total real capital stock in thousands USD per employee; at the 3-digit US SIC level
during a given year t; NBER CES variable names: CAP/EMP
NBER CES data
skill-intensityst share of compensation for non-production workers in total compensation; at the 3-digit
US SIC level during a given year t; NBER CES variable names: (PAY − PRODW)/PAY
NBER CES data
tfpst 5-factor NBER TFP index with base year 1995; tfp′95 = 1 NBER CES data
Other Controls
economic crisis is an indicator equal to 1 for the years 2007-2009
post 2000 is an indicator equal to 1 for the years 2001-2003 and equal to 0 for the years 1999-2000
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Notes: The figure shows the sample average composition of investment categories.





























Notes: The figure shows the development of the composition of investment categories over time.
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1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Share in Chinese in Total US Imports
Notes: The figure shows the average share of imports from China relative to total imports of the US for
the US SIC 3-digit industries in our sample.
























Calculation of the Marginal Effects
For every firm in our sample, we calculate the sum of expenses in each year. Then we express
the individual category investment as share of total firm investments for each year. Next, we
use these shares to calculate the average investment share of each category across all firms and
years in the sample. Because the resulting average shares do not add up to one, we re-weight
the shares accordingly.33 We use the resulting shares to construct an average depreciation rate,
where we weight the category specific depreciation rates with the respective average share in
investment. This way, we obtain an average sample depreciation rate of 23.1%, which implies
that the average firm investment lasts 1579.8 days [= (1/r)× 365].
Now we consider an increase in import competition of 60%. This corresponds to the increase of
the import competition variable in our estimation sample (from 22.4% in 1995 to 35.7% in 2009).
We use the regression results to calculate the relative change in each category. Because we do not
know the level effect of import competition on investments, we additionally need to assume the
investment elasticity in one base category. Here, we use a 0% change in Land investments with
respect to a trade shock (when regressing import competition on Land investments and adding
firm and year fixed effects, we find Land investments to be inelastic with respect to import
competition).
Applying the relative percentage changes in each category, we can then construct new after-trade-
shock investment shares. As before, we use these shares to obtain the new average depreciation
rate (24.19% for specification (5) in panel B of Table 1). Investments now fully depreciate after
1508.4 days, implying that import competition has reduced the duration of investments by about
71 days on average.
Note that these results depend on the critical values chosen for the increase in import competition
and the elasticity of Land investments with respect to import competition. Thus, letting the
percentage change in Land vary from -10% to +10% (holding constant the increase in import
competition at 60%) changes the reduction in days from -78.4 to -65.6.
33See Figures 4 and 5 for the average investment composition in our sample.
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